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Abstract   Sensibility, whether understood in moral, physical, medical, or aesthet
ic terms, seems to be a paramount case of a higherlevel, intentional property, not 
a basic property. Diderot famously claimed that matter itself senses, with sensibil
ity being a general or universal property of matter, even if he sometimes stepped 
back from this claim and called it a ‘supposition’. Crucially, sensibility here is a 
‘booster’: it enables materialism to account for the phenomena of conscious, sen
tient life, contrary to what its opponents hold, for if matter can sense, and sensibil
ity is not merely a mechanical process, then the loftiest cognitive plateaus belong 
to one and the same world as the rest of matter. Lelarge de Lignac noted this when 
he criticised Buffon for ‘granting to the body [la machine, a thencommon term 
for the body] a quality which is essential to minds, namely sensibility’. This view, 
which Diderot definitely held, was comparatively rare, stemming from medico
physiological sources including Robert Whytt, Albrecht von Haller, and Théophile 
de Bordeu. We then have, I suggest, an intellectual landscape in which newly ar
ticulated properties such as irritability and sensibility are presented either as ex
perimental properties of muscle fibres to be understood mechanistically (Hallerian 
irritability), or as properties of matter itself (whether specifically living matter as 
in Bordeu and his fellow montpelliérains Ménuret and Fouquet, or matter in gen
eral, as in Diderot). I am not convinced that their debates involve an identical con
cept, but nevertheless propose a topography of the problem of sensibility as prop
erty of matter or as vital force in mideighteenthcentury debates—not an 
exhaustive cartography of all possible theories, but an attempt to understand the 
‘triangulation’ of three views: a vitalist view in which sensibility is fundamental, 
matching up with a conception of the organism as the sum of parts conceived as 
little lives (Bordeu et al.); a broadly mechanist view which builds upwards, step by 
step, from the basic property of irritability to the higherlevel property of sensibil
ity (Haller); and, more eclectic, a materialist view which seeks to combine the ex
planatory force of the Hallerian approach with the metaphysically explosive (mo
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nistic) potential of the vitalist approach (Diderot). Examining Diderot in the con
text of this triangulated topography of sensibility as property should shed light on 
his famous proclamation regarding sensibility as a universal property of matter. 
 
Sensibilité, Sentiment (Médecine) : la faculté de sentir, le principe sensitif, ou le 
sentiment même des parties, la base et l’agent conservateur de la vie, l’animalité par 
excellence, le plus beau, le plus singulier phénomène de la nature, etc.2 
 
Sensibility, in any of its myriad realms—moral, physical, aesthetic, medical, and 
so on—seems to be a paramount case of a higherlevel, intentional property, not a 
basic property. That is, while we sometimes suspect, or at least pretend to suspect 
that rocks can sense, we do not consider sensibility an ‘atomic’ property like 
shape, size, and motion. Higherlevel properties like sensibility, thought, memory, 
desire seem to belong to higher organisms, which leaves room for debate (lizards 
have recently, as of early 2012, been shown to display learning abilities which 
lead them to be classified higher up the cognitive scale—and of course the idea of 
a ‘higher organism’ is itself a piece of folk biology). Now, materialism is often 
considered to reduce all higherlevel properties of our experience to basic ones 
such as, precisely, shape, size, and motion—which was of course the program of 
the mechanical philosophy in the seventeenth century. This leads to the once
frequent view that materialism is necessarily mechanistic materialism; as a recent 
entry in a noted secondary source, the Oxford Companion to the History of Mod
ern Science, tells us, ‘materialists explain everything in terms of matter and mo
tion; vitalists, in terms of the soul or vital force’.3 But anyone who reads a page of 
Diderot, to name one notable example, finds a very different constellation from 
this commonplace opposition between ‘matter’ and ‘sensibility’. 
Diderot famously made the bold and attributive move of postulating that matter 
itself senses, or that sensibility (perhaps better translated ‘sensitivity’ here, alt
hough for the sake of consistency, I will keep the older ‘sensibility’4) is a general 
or universal property of matter, even if he at times took a step back from this 
claim and called it a ‘supposition’. Crucially, sensibility is here playing the role of 
a ‘booster’: it enables materialism to provide a full and rich account of the phe
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nomena of conscious, sentient life, contrary to what its opponents hold: for if mat
ter can sense, and sensibility is not a merely mechanical process, then the loftiest 
cognitive plateaus are accessible to materialist analysis, or at least belong to one 
and the same world as the rest of matter. 
This was noted by the astute antimaterialist critic, the Abbé Lelarge de Lignac, 
who, in his 1751 Lettres à un Amériquain, criticised Buffon, the great naturalist, 
author of the 15volume Histoire naturelle (and its sevenvolume Supplément), 
but also theorist of generation, for ‘granting to the body [la machine, a common 
term for the body at the time] a quality which is essential to minds, namely sensi
bility’.5 This view, here attributed to Buffon and definitely held by Diderot, was 
comparatively rare. If we look for the sources of this concept, the most notable 
ones are physiological and medical treatises by prominent figures such as the Ed
inburgh professor of medicine Robert Whytt (1714–1766), the Swiss, but Göttin
genbased Albrecht von Haller (1709–1777), and the Montpellier physician Théo
phile de Bordeu (1722–1776), the latter being a key representative of the school 
we customarily refer to as the Montpellier vitalists. We then have, or so I shall try 
to sketch out, an intellectual landscape in which new—or newly articulated—
properties such as irritability and sensibility are presented either as an experi
mental property of muscle fibres that can be understood mechanistically (Hallerian 
irritability, as studied recently by Hubert Steinke), or a property of matter itself 
(whether specifically living matter as in Bordeu and his fellow montpelliérains 
Ménuret and Fouquet, or matter in general, as in Diderot). 
I am by no means convinced that it is one and the same ‘sensibility’ that is at 
issue in debates between these figures (as when Bordeu attacks Haller’s distinc
tion between irritability and sensibility and claims that ‘his own’ property of sen
sibility is both more correct and more fundamental in organic beings), but I am in
terested in mapping out a topography of the problem of sensibility as property of 
matter or as vital force in mideighteenthcentury debates—not an exhaustive car
tography of all possible positions or theories, but an attempt to understand the ‘tri
angulation’ of three views: a mechanist, or ‘enhanced mechanist’ view in which 
one can work upwards, step by step from the basic property of irritability to the 
higherlevel property of sensibility (Haller); a vitalist view in which sensibility is 
fundamental, matching up with a conception of the organism as the sum of parts 
conceived as little lives (Bordeu et al.); and, more eclectic, a materialist view 
which seeks to combine the mechanistic, componential rigour and explanatory 
power of the Hallerian approach, with the monistic and metaphysically explosive 
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potential of the vitalist approach (Diderot). It is my hope that examining Diderot 
in the context of this triangulated topography of sensibility as property sheds light 
on his famous proclamation regarding sensibility as a universal property of matter: 
‘sensibility is a universal property of matter’.6 
1 Irritability/Sensibility as Commodity or Danger: A Hallerian 
Context 
La sensibilité fait le caractère essentiel de l’animal7 
 
The idea that certain types of organic matter possess reactive or even reflexive 
properties which were termed ‘irritability’ and ‘sensibility’ was, if not ‘in the air’ 
in a vague Zeitgeistlike sense, definitely discussed by a variety of figures across 
early modern Europe, in differing contexts (more or less experimentalist, more or 
less ‘philosophical’, more or less prestigious, and so on). While the history of 
these debates has largely been mapped out,8 it is important for my purposes here to 
provide some reconstruction of this material—not least since it is so difficult to 
separate ‘experimental’ work or aspects from ‘philosophical’ statements or appro
priations of something purportedly experimental. 
The physician Francis Glisson (1598–1677), great authority on the liver, gall 
bladder, and rickets (in works such as his 1654 Anatomia hepatis), and Regius 
Professor of Physic at Cambridge, is the locus classicus for the property of irrita
bility—a term which he coined (irritabilitas), as Albrecht von Haller noted. After 
writing a number of such medical treatises, he produced the Tractatus de natura 
substantiae energetica, seu de vita naturae (1672), a metaphysics of living nature 
in which a rudimentary level of perception was posited as existing in matter itself. 
Matter contains, he stated, the root of life. Just as particular organs have a capacity 
to react to certain stimuli, so ultimately did matter itself. Irritability was the equiv
alent at the functional level to the basic property of ‘natural perception’ in matter.9 
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Albrecht von Haller’s concept of irritability, in contrast, has a distinctly exper
imental flavour—measuring the reaction of parts of the body that did not seem to 
transmit their stimulation to the ‘soul’ (which would be tantamount to reflexivity). 
This is the basic definition of how irritability differs from sensibility: 
I call that part of the human body irritable, which becomes shorter upon being touched; 
very irritable if it contracts upon a slight touch, and the contrary if by a violent touch it 
contracts but little. I call that a sensible part of the human body, which upon being 
touched transmits the impression of it to the soul.10  
This force cannot come from the nerves, since even after they have been cut, mus
cular fibres can still be irritated, and contract.11 Sensations are caused by impres
sions of objects on the nerves that transmit the impetus to the brain, and from there 
onto the soul.12 
Irritability is a quantifiable, experimentally accessible property of the muscle 
fibres, to be studied mechanistically, in the sense that there will be a correlation 
between a measurable degree of irritation and a degree of irritation of the fibres: 
between structure and function. There is no metaphysics of living matter here, at 
least in appearance. For on the one hand, to be sure, Haller wants to define irrita
bility in such a way as to rule out ‘speculative hidden qualities’.13 But on the other 
hand, when pushed as to the reason why certain types of organic matter possess 
such properties, Haller first attributes it to the ‘gluten’ within the fibre (‘irritability 
is actually a force specific to animal gluten’,14 although he wavers on this), and 
then, coming dangerously close to just as vitalist a metaphysics as Glisson (or just 
as metaphysical a vitalism), attributes this ‘vitality’ to a hidden force, the vis
insita.15 Sometimes he is more cautious, and either rejects such considerations as 
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overly philosophical (as when he wants to disqualify La Mettrie’s radical appro
priations of his work, turning irritability into a material basis for life), or plays the 
agnostic, declaring as regards the ultimate cause of irritability that the alleged 
source ‘lies concealed beyond the reach of the knife and microscope’.16 Haller the 
pupil of Boerhaave, the tireless vivisectionist, the inventor of ingenious Newtoni
aninspired or otherwise ‘geometric’ methods and concepts for quantifying the 
hitherto mysterious properties of life, is himself something of a vital force thinker. 
Positioning him correctly on an échiquier des possibles of eighteenthcentury de
bates combining, as they do, the metaphysics of the soul and the physiology of 
muscular motion, is easy in some respects, not least given his development of an 
experimental method and a ‘protocol’ by which different members of a laboratory 
can reproduce experiments, but it is difficult when it comes to metaphysical com
mitments. 
For Haller does not want irritability to be presented as a material basis for life 
in the sense of materialism (as is explicit in his polemic with La Mettrie).17 He 
wishes to preserve an independent ‘arena’ or space of existence for the soul, which 
is partly contingent on the distinction between irritability—belonging only to the 
muscles—and sensibility—which has to ‘report’ to the soul. This is also part of his 
disagreement with what I shall call below the ‘sensibility monism’ of vitalists such 
as Bordeu—a point further extended against Haller by PaulJoseph Barthez 
(1734–1806) and other montpelliérains: there is an experimental disagreement, 
there is a disagreement about the place of philosophical considerations in medical 
practice,18 but above all, Haller fears a scenario in which matter itself is alive, 
whether it is an ‘irritable matter’—La Mettrie’s—or a ‘sensible matter’—
Bordeu’s, that of other vitalists overall, and Diderot’s. 
Conversely, Haller also disagrees with Robert Whytt, a professor of medicine 
at Edinburgh, for giving too much room to the soul. Whytt’s 1751 work An Essay 
on the Vital and Other Involuntary Motions of Animals provided a general theory 
of sensibility, which he viewed as primary with respect to irritability. Whytt asso
ciated sensibility and life under the heading of one ‘active sentient principle’, 
which however he insisted could not be a mere property of matter itself.19 Put dif
ferently, irritability presupposes sensibility, so that the latter is not the sole exclu
sive property of the nerves (which were taken to include, not just the conduit, but 
the ‘nervous substance’ itself). Rather, it is distributed throughout the body, 
whereas for Haller, as we saw, certain organs and tissue types are insensible. Re
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vealingly for our purposes, Haller more than once assimilated Whytt’s view to 
Stahlian animism (the view that all active functions in the body are somehow the 
doings of the soul, which, despite being immaterial, is nevertheless controlling the 
body).20 Rather than a monism of an active sentient principle, a variant (like Glis
son’s, but differently) of a vision of active matter, Haller promotes a structural 
model, that is, ‘a decentralization of active powers within the animal economy’.21 
A key implication of this decentralised view is that irritability does not have ‘any
thing in common with the soul’, as Haller put it.22 There is both a functional rea
son for this (the distinction between two types of properties but also two levels), 
and a metaphysical reason: both Whytt and La Mettrie pose metaphysical dangers, 
not so much ‘animism or materialism’ as they are usually presented, but really, 
materialism simpliciter, understood as a theory which explains the higherlevel in 
terms of the lowerlevel. 
If the problem is materialism, then it may even be artificial to separate the issue 
into levels—of matter, of functions, etc.—versus metaphysics: for the concern 
with levels is a metaphysical concern, with the lower and the higher. As Roger 
French comments nicely, 
Haller reserves the adjective ‘sensible’ for those organs or tissues which are capable of 
communicating to the soul within the brain and there arousing a conscious sensation. He 
therefore never accepted Whytt’s notion of unconscious sensation, a mere lowly animal 
‘feeling’ of the sort that allowed oysters to close up at the approach of danger’.23 
I hope it is clear that, as in the other episodes of our story, what is at issue is an 
act of attribution of higherlevel properties to a lowerlevel substrate; and more 
broadly, the articulation of a concept of living matter in which sensibility is the 
operative property. Haller himself—not Glisson, not Whytt, not Bordeu, and not 
Diderot—states that ‘[s]ensibility is the essential trait of the animal. That which 
senses is an animal, that which does not sense is not’24 (the latter two thinkers do 
say such things, but my point is that here it is Haller himself speaking). 
The story of irritability and sensibility, and their provenance and derivations in 
this period could be extended much further (with, e.g., Baglivi, Stahl, and Bonnet) 
but as I indicated at the outset, my aim is more limited in the sense that I want to 
                                                          
20 The debate (rather acrimonious as it was) continued for years: Whytt replied to Haller in his 
‘Observations on the Sensibility and Irritability of the Parts of Man and Other Animals: occa
sioned by Dr. Haller’s late Treatise on these Subjects’, in Whytt 1768; Haller’s later Mémoires 
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contrast three positions: higherlevel properties as mechanistically specifiable 
properties of certain types of matter (Haller), as features of all living, organised 
animal matter25—organised as a system of interconnecting ‘little lives’ (the vitalist 
view), and lastly, as universal properties of matter itself (materialism, in its 
Diderotian variant). What is noteworthy so far is that even in the most mechanism
friendly part of the story, Haller’s, the risk of slipping into a form of vitalism (for 
there are many forms of vitalism!26) is constant, and perhaps made all the more 
explicit by the way in which figures like Glisson, and later Whytt or Stahl, need to 
be portrayed as defending purely idealistic, experimentally unsound or unground
ed metaphysics of life, as distinct from a more naturalistically grounded scientific 
study of organisms. 
If Glisson’s approach was an attribution of higherlevel properties to a lower 
level he called ‘living nature’, which was negatively portrayed by Haller so as to 
guarantee his own experimental, scientific legitimacy, while presenting his prede
cessor as a mysteriousforce vitalist,27 the tension between Haller, Bordeu and the 
vitalists, and Diderot (who is in more of a ‘dialectical’ position with respect to the 
others) shows that a linear portrayal of the debate is a hopeless task, particularly a 
‘positivistic’ account in which thinkers gradually move from metaphysical specu
lation to ‘real science’ via experimental trial and error. That is, as I shall indicate 
in closing, there is a permanent vitalist remainder in the attribution of a mindlike, 
reactive, and/or intentional property to a system of organised matter. Not only are 
the abovementioned tensions not empirically resolvable (as if it were a matter of 
deciding between three theories of reflex action, or three disciplinary definitions 
of the role of physiology); their lack of resolution is also not just ideological (e.g. 
regarding commitments to a preserved space for the soul, given a naturalistic ac
count of mental life), but metaphysical: the fear of attributing higherlevel proper
ties to a basic substrate, such as matter. Curiously, however, there is no neat sepa
ration between orthodox dualists and heterodox materialists here. Notably, 
because all parties, as I have noted, keep on slipping into various kinds of vital
ism—never in the sense of mysterious vital forces like Hans Driesch’s entelechies 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but rather in the sense of the 
insistence on the uniqueness of the functional properties of certain types of mate
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rial arrangements, namely, arrangements that form ‘organised wholes’, also 
known as corps organisés, or ‘organisms’ in our vocabulary, or ‘animal econo
mies’ to use the period’s term. Now, where this slippage into monism (since here 
the vitalist concept, or family of concepts, is one and the same as the monist con
cept28) frightens some thinkers, it is on the contrary a desirable outcome to others, 
not least since it allows for a naturalistically respectable way of dealing with com
plex properties: what I call sensibility as a ‘booster’ of matter. 
2 Sensibility as GoBetween or Unifier: Vitalist Scenarios 
la doctrine de la sensibilité [est] la même avec celle du vitalisme29 
 
When we speak of the Montpellier vitalists, we are referring to the group of physi
cians and professors of medicine (but also anatomy, botany, etc.) at the Faculty of 
Medicine at Montpellier, beginning in the mideighteenth century; the term ‘vital
ist’ was applied to this group from approximately 1800, and indeed served as a 
selfdescription during those decades, although some, like PaulJoseph Barthez, 
declared, after most of the influential works—by La Caze, Bordeu et al.—had al
ready been published, that he did not ‘wish to be the Leader of the Sect of the Vi
talists’.30 Given their shared insistence on sensibility as the sole, defining property 
of living beings, against Haller’s basic distinction between irritability and sensibil
ity, the vitalists could just as easily have been called ‘sensibilists’; although in the 
end, Henri Fouquet, when reflecting retrospectively on their movement in an 1803 
work, simply stated that the terms amount to the same thing, since whatever is 
sensitive (or sensible) is vital (‘everything that senses, is vital’31). 
With the vitalists, two major transformations occur with regard to the concept 
of sensibility as we have encountered it, primarily in its Hallerian presentation. 
Empirically—or at a level presented as empirical, experimentally founded, ob
servationally documented, and so on—sensibility is now presented as the primary 
and general property of living beings (tantamount to life, as Fouquet says above), 
so that the distinction between irritability and sensibility is jettisoned. To take two 
examples amongst many, GabrielFrançois Venel (1723–1775), a chemist and 
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physician who was close to Théophile de Bordeu, and authored the long, dense en
try ‘Chymie’ in the Encyclopédie, stated in the twoline entry ‘Irritabilité (Physi
ologie)’, which is mainly a renvoi to Fouquet’s long entry ‘Sensibilité’, that irrita
bility was a word invented by Glisson, then revived ‘nowadays by the famous Mr 
Haller’, ‘to refer to a particular mode of a more general faculty of the organic parts 
of animals, which we will discuss under the name “sensibility”’.32 Irritability is 
just a mode of a more general and primary property, sensibility. Another, brilliant 
and understudied, Montpellier vitalist figure was JeanJoseph Ménuret de Cham
baud (1733–1815), whom I shall not discuss in detail here.33 In his fascinating ar
ticle ‘Œconomie Animale’, Ménuret, too, refers to the property Glisson called irri
tability, in order to fold it into the more essential property of sensibility. The basic 
features of life, Ménuret argues, are ‘movement and feeling (sentiment)’ and these 
are ‘probably reducible to one basic (primitif) kind’, a yet more basic property, a 
‘singular property, the source of movement and feeling as connected to the organ
ic nature of the elements composing the body’. Ménuret adds that this property 
depends on a unique type of union between molecules, which Francis Glisson dis
covered, and named irritability—but in fact, it is really just a mode of sensibility: 
‘such a union of these molecules […] which in truth, is just a mode of sensibil
ity’.34 Forty years later, Fouquet, in his Discours sur la clinique, sounds the same 
theme—Haller ‘falsely presented irritability as separate from sensibility, while it 
is essentially and necessarily related to the former’.35 
Metaphysically, a major step is taken towards the assertion of a ‘monistic’ 
ground in which a certain type of matter, organised matter, is alive and senses. 
Bordeu repeatedly insists that sensibility is neither strictly mechanical nor a prop
erty of the soul: it is immanent in living fibres but decentralised and differentiated, 
since it takes on a form specific to the function of each organ. It is also, he insists 
                                                          
32 Venel 1765, 909b. 
33 For mysterious reasons Ménuret published mainly under the name JeanJacques, although his 
given name was JeanJoseph, and his birth date is usually wrongly given as 1733. His Montpel
lier doctorate in medicine was on biological generation, arguing for epigenesis contra pre
existence (De Generatione Dissertatione Physiologica, 1757). Closer inspection of the medical 
articles in the Encyclopédie, notably by Roselyne Rey in her 1987 thesis, published posthumous
ly in 2000, indicated that Ménuret was a major contributor, whose articles display a high degree 
of intellectual coherence (Jacques Roger and Jacques Proust had called attention to Ménuret ear
lier). In Rey’s view, if we set aside the case of the ‘polygraph’ Chevalier de Jaucourt, Ménuret’s 
contribution to the medical articles in the Encyclopédie, from volume 8 onwards (excluding 
anatomy, surgery, and the material medica) is the largest, most homogeneous set of texts in that 
work (Rey 2000, 72). His articles span volumes 8–17, and were written between late 1758 and 
1761, when he was aged 19 to 22. Ménuret spent most of his later career as an ‘attending physi
cian’ at the Montélimar hospital. 
34 Ménuret 1765, 361. 
35 Fouquet 1803, 78–79, N. 5. 
11 
along with other montpelliérains, ‘easier to understand than irritability’, and ‘can 
serve quite well as a basis for explaining all vital phenomena, whether in a state of 
health or of disease’.36 As much as the vitalists often say that their type of inquiry 
is neither as reductive as that of the ‘mechanists’ (the target varies here, some
times Boerhaave, sometimes the Italian iatromechanists, sometimes even Haller, 
despite how far removed he is from strict mechanism), nor as supernatural and un
experimental as that of the animists, Bordeu—in this rather different from Mé
nuret or Fouquet—is willing to tie his originality to Stahlian animism, specifically 
with regard to sensibility, which he names as the feature common to his, Stahl’s, 
and Van Helmont’s models: ‘one cannot deny that those who treat each part of the 
body as an organ or a kind of being or animal with its own movements, action, de
partment, tastes, and particular sensibility drew from the same sources as the 
Stahlians’.37 
That sensibility is deliberately being construed as an antimechanist concept 
appears notably with Bordeu’s choice of ‘model organism’, the glands, because 
their secretory and excretory capacity is precisely the type of function that the 
mechanist model could not do justice to; they respond to stimuli in ways that 
mechanism cannot specify, but which are also, of course, independent of soul or 
will. Bordeu’s major work, the Recherches anatomiques sur la position des 
glandes et sur leur action (1752), is devoted to this topic. In this sense harking 
back to Glisson (who, as shown by Giglioni, was rather more of an active experi
menter than Haller gave him credit for), Bordeu wants to stress that the glands 
have an innate activity and responsiveness to stimuli which can regulate the ‘fluid 
dynamics’ of the exchange between the inside and outside of a gland: this property 
is sensibility. Consistent with the idea that the glands are so many little lives 
(which, however, are independent of the soul), Bordeu also describes this respon
siveness as dependent on a kind of sensation: 
Secretion can thus be reduced to a kind of sensation, if I may speak thus; the parts that can 
excite a given sensation will pass through, while the others are rejected; each gland, each 
orifice will have, so to speak, its personal taste; everything foreign will ordinarily be 
rejected.38 
Through this property, fibres, tissues, organs, and organ systems carry out se
quences of actions according to what Tobias Cheung has called stimulusreaction 
schemes.39 For Bordeu, this type of interconnective action is expressed through 
                                                          
36 Bordeu 1768/1818, 668. 
37 Bordeu 1768/1818, 671. 
38 Bordeu 1752/1818, Sect. 108, 163. Compare Diderot’s, ‘Why does each gland have its particu
lar secretion? One cannot really answer otherwise than in terms of irritants, sensibility, animality, 
taste, the will of the organs’. (Diderot 1778/1975–, 387.) 
39 Cheung 2010, 66–104. 
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notions such as ‘sympathy’ and the ‘consensus of the parts’, which hark back to 
the older ‘conspiration’ (as in Claude Perrault’s statement that living bodies differ 
from ‘inanimate bodies’ because the former possess ‘sympathy and mutual con
spiration’; he also speaks of ‘commerce’ and ‘mutual need’40). In this sense, sensi
bility is also a network concept, which easily shows how it can be picked up to
gether with other concepts of the nervous system by a thinker like Diderot—but it 
is also a strictly material concept, without either any intervention of an entity such 
as the soul, or even of an ‘emergentist’ conception of hierarchical levels of organi
sation. 
However, there is an ambivalence about the ontological status of sensibility (to 
borrow an expression from Tobias Cheung’s discussion of Bordeu).41 That is, gen
erally speaking, sensibility is a property of living matter for Bordeu. And his writ
ing focuses on medical entities (rather than questions of basic structure or physiol
ogy42), stressing that the physician is an observer, rather than a quantitative natural 
philosopher (or experimental physiologist) seeking to discover, say, laws of nerv
ous energy. The physician does not posit the soul, vital principles, or entelechies 
either. Nevertheless, questions remain. For one, Bordeu, Fouquet, and Barthez in 
particular speak philosophical language at times (as do Bichat and Bernard in the 
next generations), but especially, they conceive of sensibility in terms of the prop
erty of a substance. Whether or not vitalists are like Stahlians (they often say they 
are not, but as we saw, Bordeu sometimes equates his sensibility concept with 
Stahl and Van Helmont), they fall somewhere on this spectrum. Consider this 
somewhat inflated statement by CharlesLouis Dumas (1765–1813), the Dean of 
the Montpellier medical faculty in the early nineteenth century, who is defending 
the Montpellier school in a ‘wise’, retrospective analysis: 
The various tendencies in medicine stem from philosophers’ mistaken applications of the 
physical sciences or the metaphysical sciences, to the doctrine of living beings. Those 
who relied excessively on the physical sciences produced the ancient and widespread sect 
of the materialists. Those who relied on the metaphysical sciences produced the equally 
ancient sect of the spiritualists. In between these two, there exists a third class of 
physiologists who do not relate all the phenomena of life to matter or the soul, but to an 
intermediate principle which possesses properties (faculties) different from the one and 
the other, and which regulates, disposes and orders all acts of vitality, without being 
impelled by the physical impulses of the material body or the moral affections and 
intellectual foresight of the thinking principle.43 
As a side note, it is interesting that Dumas uses such pure philosophical lan
guage to classify trends in medicine. (Claude Bernard also, as I noted, combines 
                                                          
40 Perrault 1680, 201. 
41 Cheung 2010, 94. 
42 Boury 2008, 528. 
43 Dumas 1806, Vol. 1, 296, quoted in Rey 2000, 386. 
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philosophical and physiological language, but when he classifies previous doc
trines it is to show how far removed they are from experimental, laboratory sci
ence; no such coupure here.) But what does Dumas say? That materialists reduce 
everything to physics, animists (here termed spiritualists) are overly metaphysical, 
and finally the vitalists, who do things right, do not reduce vital phenomena either 
to matter or to the soul. What is this vitalist third way (which we need to grasp if 
we wish to grasp anything distinctive about Enlightenment vitalism)? If Dumas 
does not say: we vitalists operate heuristically and have understood that, unlike 
our predecessors, we should bracket off ontological considerations, Barthez does 
actually say exactly this, in the second edition of his Nouveaux éléments, in 1806, 
in a chapter with the revealing title ‘Sceptical considerations on the nature of the 
vital principle’, where he explains that he ‘personifies’ the vital principle only ‘in 
order to refer to it more easily’; it really has no existence apart from that of the 
body. And above all, he adds, ‘I am wholly indifferent to Ontology as the science 
of entities’.44 
Bordeu had just such hesitations himself with regard to the ontological status of 
his ‘principle’, which he calls sensibility. If we recall that sensibility is often de
scribed as a ‘selfpreserving force’ by these authors, that is, a type of reactivity or 
capacity for responsiveness that ensures our survival (e.g. Fouquet defines it as 
‘the basis and preservative agent of life’45 and later, Diderot speaks of sensibility 
as a ‘quality unique to the animal, which warns it of its relations to the surround
ing environment’46), it is noteworthy that in a key passage of the Recherches 
anatomiques—actually a footnote to what is probably the most famous passage of 
the book, where he introduces the metaphor of the beeswarm to describe organis
mic unity—Bordeu asks if the ‘evervigilant preservative force’ that watches over 
‘all living parts’, belongs to ‘the essence of a part of matter, or a necessary attrib
ute of its combinations?’.47 It is not possible to reconstruct Bordeu’s thinking fur
ther and provide a definite answer to his question. But we can learn from this that 
the vitalist doctrine of sensibility poses itself the question, both of the ontological 
status of this property overall, and of the specific situation that obtains with regard 
to sensibility as (general) property of matter or (more restrictively) of organisa
tion. 
                                                          
44 Barthez 1806, Vol. 1, 107, 99, Chap. 3, N. 17, 96 (it can be confusing that the notes added to 
this edition have their own pagination, also in Arabic numerals: thus the reader can read about 
the metaphysics of substance on page 96 of the main text and not find ‘ontology’, but if she turns 
to later sections where the page numbers restart, these sections appear). 
45 Fouquet 1765, 38b. 
46 Diderot 1778/1975–, 305. 
47 Interestingly—not least for commentators interested in the role of analogy in science—Bordeu 
here concedes that he must be content here with analogies, ‘metaphorical expressions, compari
sons’. Bordeu 1752/1818, Sect. 108, 163, Note. Emphasis added. 
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Vitalist sensibility—Bordeu’s and others’—is not a merely mechanicalreaction 
property, because of its ‘network’ dimension, its way of explaining and at the 
same time implying the consensual, sympathetic interaction of the organic parts 
understood as little lives. I have mentioned this idea earlier, but only in passing; 
suffice it to say, here, that it is a core idea of Montpellier vitalism, consisting in 
the following: the organism (living body, animal economy) is not a set of inani
mate parts but of organs understood as so many little lives. Ménuret speaks of ‘the 
general life formed by the particular lives of the organs’48; Fouquet says that ‘each 
organ senses or lives in its own way, and the concurrence (concours) or sum of 
these particular lives is life in general’.49 The point was perhaps made best of all 
in an almost unknown text, a medical thesis on irritability defended at Montpellier 
in 1776 by a certain Mr ‘D.G.’ (who further research identifies as Jean Charles 
Marguerite Guillaume de Grimaud): this applies down to the level of the socalled 
molecules composing each organ, ‘the life of each organ of the animate body is 
not a simple life, but the real product of as many particular lives as there are living 
molecules entering into the composition of the organ’.50 This is neither mere ag
gregation of matter, nor mechanical relations between parts defined by shape, size, 
motion (and position). 
However, like irritability, sensibility as discussed here is exclusively material 
and thus without any ‘transcendent’ or ‘spiritual’ dimension.51 That is, as 
d’Holbach put it, whether sensibility is ‘a quality that can be communicated, like 
motion, and is acquired through combination’, or instead ‘a quality inherent to all 
of matter’, in both cases, it cannot belong to ‘an unextended being, as the human 
soul is thought to be’.52 Further, sensibility has both a reductionist dimension (in 
this not so far removed from Haller’s irritability) and a holistic dimension: the 
former, because there is a specific analysis of types of tissue, of the structure and 
function of glands, and so on; the latter, because what is then stressed is the way in 
which organs interact and produce ‘systemic’ or ‘organisational’ properties. The 
more reductionist vision is apparent when Fouquet, when he underscores the com
patibility of Haller’s system and the system of sensibility (i.e. his own and Bor
deu’s), speaks both of the ‘consensus of organs’ and of ‘their location’ (i.e. spa
                                                          
48 Ménuret 1765, 361b 
49 Fouquet 1765, 42b. 
50 Grimaud 1776, 12 (emphasis in original). I first encountered this text, quoted (only as ‘D. G.’; 
I have added the attribution) in Huneman 2007, 262–276, 390–394 (notes), here, 390, N. 2. 
51 Boury 2008, 529. 
52 d’Holbach 1770/1998–2001, 229–230. 
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tial, positional information).53 Or, to take an example from a different, but familiar 
author, La Mettrie in his ‘materialist’ rendition of the concept of irritability, also 
insists that each fibre of animal bodies moves according to an inherent principle, 
but with a less holistic result than, for instance, what Bordeu (or Diderot) will 
promote: 
each little fibre, or part of an organised body, is impelled by its own principle, the action 
of which is not dependent on the nerves, unlike voluntary motions; since these motions 
occur without the parts involved being in any interaction (commerce) with circulation.54 
What is different in Fouquet’s sense of the consensus/conspiration/sympathy of 
organic parts is that it is a structural view. For instance, he also speaks of the 
‘economic action of sensibility’, with the term ‘economic’ being reminiscent of 
the technical term ‘animal economy’, that is, a system of interdependent relations 
over and beyond ordinary aggregation of matter, bringing together various ‘lives’ 
(active organs) in a manner he describes as ‘harmony, symmetry and arrange
ment’. However, Fouquet—like Bordeu—remains agnostic about whether this 
harmony, this ‘economic action’ is the result of interaction or just of an additive 
accumulation of parts (‘the concurrence or sum of these particular lives’55), closer 
to La Mettrie’s vision. 
It is hard to reduce vitalist sensibility to a straightforward claim or set of empir
ical points, whether we take our bearings for these from the history of medicine, of 
hybrid discourses ‘of the nerves’, passions, and spirits, or of course from philoso
phy. Yet at the same time, the Montpellier vitalists are consistent over time with a 
set of claims they make with respect to this property, even if they can be more or 
less Stahlian, more or less Halleriancompatible, more or less materialism
friendly. There is a general sensibility monism here which makes it all the more 
natural that Diderot found it such an appealing concept—or an appealing medico
theoretical construct to turn into a concept, in order to challenge the Cartesian du
alism laid out by the character d’Alembert in the first dialogue of the Rêve de 
d’Alembert.56 
                                                          
53 Fouquet 1765, 51a. It is important to remember that articles like these, which came out in the 
1765 ‘batch’ of the Encyclopédie, are thus fifteen years posterior to Bordeu’s Recherches 
anatomiques. 
54 This is La Mettrie’s comment in L’HommeMachine, after listing ten experiments proving 
mindbody interaction. La Mettrie 1748, 74; 1960, 181–182. 
55 Fouquet 1765, 42b. 
56 I am not claiming there is some basic, unwavering relation between the ‘practice’ of physi
cians and the ‘conceptualisation’ of a philosopher—here, Diderot. Both because these physicians 
are very much médecinsphilosophes, sometimes selfproclaimed, and their writings can bristle 
with philosophical references (especially Barthez who revised his Nouveaux elements with more 
and more empiricist references, pasting in Bacon and Hume in a desperate hope that his treatise 
would turn into a perfect piece of empiricism); and of course, because Diderot operates across 
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3 Sensibility as a BoosterProperty of Matter in Diderot 
le vivant et l’animé, au lieu d’être un degré métaphysique des êtres est une propriété 
physique de la matière57 
 
In the very first paragraph of Diderot’s 1769 ‘dialogue’ Le Rêve de d’Alembert, 
which was one of his two personal favourites amongst his works (the other being a 
mathematical essay on probabilities58), the character d’Alembert, who is a partisan 
of substance dualism, challenges the character Diderot—a materialist, as it hap
pens—to account for the existence of consciousness and thought, and in doing so, 
introduces the problem of sensibility as a property. Referring to a discussion that 
seems to have taken place before the text begins, he declares to Diderot, ‘this sen
sibility […] if it is a general and essential quality of matter, then stones must 
sense’.59 That is, if the character Diderot thinks he can successfully defend think
ing matter, or a variant of it, by reconfiguring it as sensing matter, the character 
d’Alembert responds: then you will also need to grant that stones can sense. Sen
sibility is hence present from the first lines of the text, and the word (sensibilité) is 
used a total of 37 times. 
How can we define the steps taken from Haller, Bordeu et al. to Diderot? There 
are two equally trivial ways to proceed, which are roughly symmetrical, and focus 
respectively on two different works by Diderot, which indeed have a very differ
ent status. One is to view Diderot as a kind of protoBachelardian poet
metaphysician of the cosmos,60 as manifest in the Rêve with its ‘human polyps on 
Jupiter or Saturn!’,61 and thus present his contribution as a kind of leap into asso
ciative freedom beyond the constrained empirical studies of Haller and others. 
Sometimes this speculative dimension, in which Diderot’s scientific imagination 
                                                                                                                                     
multiple registers—chiefly, for present purposes, an experimentalnaturalistic novel or dialogue, 
Le Rêve de d’Alembert, and a naturalistic protowork, the Éléments de physiologie—which stand 
in a fertile but ambiguous relation to each other. The wellknown fact that Bordeu is also a char
acter in the Rêve should illustrate the difficulty of traditional distinctions (without it having to 
imply that Diderot was the first postmodern, or practitioner of intertextuality). 
57 Diderot and Daubenton, 1751, 474a (quoting Buffon, Histoire générale des animaux, ‘Com
paraison des animaux et des végétaux’). 
58 Diderot 1955–1961, Vol. 9, 126. Cf. ‘Fragments dont on n’a pas pu retrouver la véritable 
place’, in Diderot 1975–, Vol. 17, 223. The Rêve was unpublished during Diderot’s lifetime (he 
gave one copy to Catherine the Great as a gift). 
59 Diderot 1769/1975–, 90. 
60 As in Alexander 1953 and (in a more sophisticated way) SaintAmand 1984, where the cosmic 
dimensions of Diderot’s speculations are now justified with quotations on complexity from 
Michel Serres. 
61 Diderot 1769/1975–, 125. 
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can reach conceptual ‘places’ that science cannot, is described as a kind of sci
encefiction, or more aptly, as ‘a thought experiment on sensibility’, in Anne Vi
la’s terms, although she notes that it is a thought experiment which instantly has 
material effects and conversely, is itself ‘materialised’.62 
The other approach focuses on the Éléments de physiologie (an unfinished text 
on which Diderot worked in the late 1770s), and views Diderot as a commentator 
on scientific studies of sensibility, who remains at the level of fragments, unable 
to provide his own scientific theory. Namely, if Haller’s physiology contributed 
the idea of a combinatorial system composed of the structural elements of the or
ganism, which amounted to a system of functional vital properties corresponding 
to various levels of organic integration,63 Diderot is, on this view, either a mere 
commentator on such concepts, or a naturalistically inclined philosopher seeking 
to accumulate information to support his general vitalmaterialist views. 
A more sympathetic or expansive version of this view, which grants Diderot 
more originality, is to view his reflections on irritability and sensibility, fibres and 
organs, bodies and networks as a genuine expansion of vitalist organicism, in the 
direction of a total ‘science of man’, understood as an integrated doctrine of the 
physical and the moral. And it has been observed by commentators at least as far 
back as Yvon Belaval that the Éléments, which Diderot probably intended to pub
lish if he had been able to continue, closely resembles contemporary treatises on 
‘L’Homme’ such as those by Marat or Le Camus.64 Indeed, there is a careful artic
ulation of Haller, Bordeu, and Barthez in the Éléments (along with Whytt and ad
ditional figures I shall not discuss); the title itself is, of course, the same as that of 
the French translation of Haller’s 1747 Primae lineae physiologiae: Elémens de 
physiologie (first translation by Tarin, 1752, second translation by Bordenave, 
1769). 
Diderot brings together a mechanistically oriented account of a structural rela
tion between solid parts (from Haller), the more holistic sense of an integrated 
network of sensibility/sympathy (from Bordeu and Barthez), and various other 
theories of organic matter concerning what we might call ‘vital minima’, that is, 
the minimal constituents of organic life which are themselves ‘alive’ and pos
sessed of animate properties.65 And he collapses any residual dualist distinction 
between irritability and sensibility (which after all, in Haller and in Whytt, alt
hough in completely different ways, had served to preserve a concept of soul): ‘In 
                                                          
62 Vila 1998, 74. For my discussion of this issue see Wolfe 2007, 317–328. 
63 Duchesneau 1999, 197. In the later portions of his article Duchesneau seems to defend Dide
rot’s originality as a contributor to medicophysiological theory. 
64 Belaval 2003, 257. 
65 Wolfe 2010, 38–65. 
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general, in the animal and in each of its parts—life, sensibility, irritation’.66 Dif
ferently from Whytt or Bordeu and his colleagues who had to insist on a quasi
metaphysical primacy of sensibility, Diderot just renders them identical: 
This force of irritability is different from any other known force; it is life, sensibility; 
specific to the soft fibre; weaker, then extinct in the tightened fibre; greater in the fibre 
attached to the body than to the fibre separated from it. This force is not dependent on 
gravity, attraction or elasticity.67 
The life of the ‘whole animal’, is the composite of the life of each organic 
component, interacting in a relation of ‘sympathy’, which sometimes is not de
pendent on any centre, any ‘controller’ at all: ‘there are sensing and living organs, 
coupling, sympathising and concurring towards the same goal, without the partici
pation of the whole animal’.68 This raises the question of the unity of the organism 
(in the Rêve, the unity of the self, which Mlle de Lespinasse worries about—to 
which the character Bordeu replies precisely with a doctrine of organismic unity, 
that is, you are yourself because of the individuality of your body or organisa
tion). After all, if an organism is a sum of many lives, whether this is an additive 
sum or one that involves qualitative shifts, where is the limit? This is another one 
of the difficult questions which neither Diderot nor Bordeu—both of whom pose 
it—resolve to anyone’s satisfaction, including their own. One recalls that Bordeu 
introduced the image of the beeswarm as a metaphor of organic unity, and Dide
rot, although he expands on it and adds other metaphors including the spiderweb 
and the harpsichord (for the vibrating ‘strings’ of the nervous system), does not 
present it as anything other than that. Now, my purpose here is not to reconstruct a 
possible ‘materialist theory of the self’, in Diderot and others,69 but rather to en
quire into the extent to which a concept like sensibility functions as a ‘booster’ for 
the materialist—a functional booster, at the level of physiology and medicine, and 
an ontological booster, with respect to levels of organisation, emergence, and re
duction. 
Yet we must not lose sight of the fact that this appropriation of the concept of 
sensibility is a key part of Diderot’s attempt to articulate organic unity, as some
thing different from the unity of machines, or that of the universe as a whole. And, 
crucially for the specifically biomedical context I have sketched, this attempt is 
not generically metaphysical or inspired by classic texts in the history of philoso
phy, but is particularly close to medical texts such as Bordeu’s; as Henry Martyn 
Lloyd suggests in Chap. 8, ‘for the discourse of sensibility, the master discourse 
                                                          
66 Diderot 1778/1975–, 449. 
67 Diderot 1778/1975–, 308. 
68 Diderot 1778/1975–, 501. 
69 I attempt an initial presentation of the problem in Wolfe 2011a. 
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was medicine’. Even if the idea of matter as possessing animate features can be 
viewed as something Leibnizian (as a ‘materialisation of the monad’, as it is some
times described, or a kind of panpsychism, which La Mettrie had already recog
nised as a danger: ‘the Leibnizians, with their Monads, put forth an unintelligible 
hypothesis. They have spiritualised matter rather than materializing the soul’70), or 
as harking back to Renaissance matter theory as in Campanella,71 it has a very par
ticularly medical, embodied flavour here. Consider Diderot’s approach to the unity 
of animals or organisms he calls ‘continuity’ as opposed to the merely spatial 
‘contiguity’ that exists between heaps of matter: ‘Without sensibility and the law 
of continuity in animal substance (contexture), without these two qualities, the an
imal cannot be one’.72 Biology and medicine or metaphysics were hard to separate 
with respect to sensibility as late as the midnineteenth century, as noted by Littré: 
‘sensibility or the function of the nerves […] is a final terrain in which theology 
and metaphysics still compete with biology’.73 
That sensibility is a medical concept with an expansive conceptual potential 
can also be seen in another way: Diderot (and partly La Mettrie before him, for 
whom ‘irritability’ is the general monistic term rather than ‘sensibility’) sees that a 
concept such as sensibility allows him to integrate conceptually the reactivity and 
representational capacity of mind (the nervous system, the brain as a ‘book which 
reads itself’, as Diderot puts it74) while maintaining a thoroughgoing naturalism—
there are no properties which are not properties of natural beings subject to causal 
processes as specified in the natural sciences (whatever these may be: thus the 
naturalism of a Hobbes or a d’Holbach, who seem to be intuitively physicalists, is 
very much a reduction to the physical properties of matter, while the naturalism of 
a Gassendi, a Diderot, or, a few decades later, an Erasmus Darwin is a reduction to 
                                                          
70 La Mettrie 1748, 2; 1960, 149. 
71 Diderot provides some indication as to the Leibnizian provenance of his idea of sensibility as a 
universal property of matter in his Encyclopédie entry ‘Leibnitzianisme’, where he associates Ar
istotelian entelechies, monads, and ‘sensibility [as] a general property of matter’ (Diderot 1765b, 
371a). As in other cases, his source is Johann Jakob Brucker’s 1744 Historia critica philosophiæ. 
Belaval notes that the publication of JeanBaptiste Robinet’s Leibnizian Philosophie de la nature 
in 1765—the year of the letter to Duclos—may have led Diderot to the idea of consideration of 
animate parcels of matter (Belaval 2003, 334, N. 3). For more on the Leibnizian background of 
sensibility, see Nakagawa 1999, 199–217. Jean Varloot sees the notion of a universal sensibility 
in matter as going back all the way to Campanella! (in Diderot 1962, Vol. 3, ci, N. 3). 
72 Diderot 1778/1975–, 307. 
73 Littré 1846, 229. 
74 ‘The soft substance of the brain [is] a mass of sensitive and living wax, which can take on all 
sorts of shapes, losing none of those it received, and ceaselessly receiving new ones which it re
tains. There is the book. But where is the reader? The reader is the book itself. For it is a sensing, 
living, speaking book, which communicates by means of sounds and gestures the order of its 
sensations’. (Diderot 1778/1975–, 470.) 
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matter conceived as the bearer of vital, animate properties, typically attributed to 
minimal components of matter named ‘semences’, ‘seminarerum’, or ‘mole
cules’75). This naturalism has been interpreted in various ways by Diderot com
mentators in recent decades: as ‘monism’, or ‘holism’, or again ‘emergentism’. 
These contemporary terminological decisions do not modify the fundamental intu
ition that (i) matter is ‘one’, a unified whole (both at the level accessible to our 
measuring instruments and at a metaphysical level: Nature makes no leaps), (ii) 
properties such as sensibility, consciousness, memory, desire, instinct are ‘just 
there’—no room for external world scepticism, ‘no pleasure that is felt is chimeri
cal’76—and as such belong to the material whole as stated in (i). 
Diderot is less willing to commit to a definitive position regarding (iii) whether 
these properties are universal properties of matter, as he often says (we might also 
say ‘basic properties’, thinking of Ménuret’s insistence that movement and sensi
bility reduce to ‘one primitive notion’77), or properties only of organised wholes: 
‘Sensibility, a general property of matter or a product of organisation’.78 The first 
view certainly fulfils the requirements of a materialist metaphysics, and is pleas
ingly immanentist, except that it is also a potentially ‘panpsychist’ view in which 
tiny parcels of matter are themselves said to think, feel, remember, and react (re
call La Mettrie’s warning about ‘spiritualising matter’); the second view offers the 
advantage of a hierarchical arrangement in which there are levels of organisa
tion—today we might say ‘levels of complexity’—which are interrelated within a 
general material whole. 
Here we leave specifically Bordevian or vitalist territory in Diderot and return 
to metaphysics. In the earlier Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature (1753), Di
derot had reflected on the quasiaporia of the relation between living matter and 
dead matter, and put forth a series of ‘queries’ (somewhat reminiscent of the Que
ries which followed Newton’s Opticks) which tended to challenge the distinction 
between these two states. Whether we view this as an empirical or a metaphysical 
issue in Diderot, he definitely insists that the distinction is false inasmuch as what 
is alive is constantly in a process of fermentation and corruption, and what is dead 
is conversely in a process of being assimilated into life, like the marble of the stat
ue, ground into earth, growing into plants, and eaten by animals, and so on—a 
process for which he or d’Holbach coined a term, ‘animalisation’. As Diderot says 
in his marginal commentary on Franz Hemsterhuis’s Lettre sur l’homme (1773–
1774): 
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When I was born, I could only sense along a length of about eighteen inches at the most. 
How was I able, with time, to feel along a length of five feet and some inches? I ate. I 
digested. I animalised. By a process of assimilation, I turned corps bruts from inert to 
active sensibility.79 
So animalisation is a process which ensures that matter is sensible, since it is con
stantly moving from inert to active; and the new distinction between inert sensibil
ity and active sensibility can help resolve some of the above difficulties.80 But 
isn’t this just another version of dead matter versus living matter? Or (to point to a 
different problem), monism seems to indicate that Diderot should opt for one kind 
of matter, not two, and then claim that this matter senses. But—as he notices in his 
critique of Maupertuis’ panpsychism—it seems to be a mistake (although of what 
sort is not clear: empirical? metaphysical?) to endow the element—the ‘mole
cule’—with the properties of the whole—l’organisation, or here, to endow matter 
with the properties of organised wholes.81 
Again, what is the status of sensibility? Diderot’s dilemma, or at least his onto
logical decision, returns here: ‘Sensibility, a general property of matter or a prod
uct of organisation’.82 He addresses this in a variety of texts—‘speculative’ ones 
such as the Rêve, ‘experimental’ ones such as the Éléments (however much the 
distinction between speculative and experimental may be shopworn and of limited 
use here), letters to Sophie Volland (October 1759) and betterknown, to Duclos 
(October 1765), commentaries and critiques on other thinkers such as Hemsterhuis 
and Helvétius. Before trying to achieve some resolution on the issue by way of 
conclusion, let me try and map out the situation in Diderot. 
First, there is no clearcut distinction between different texts which represent 
different positions on the issue, as some have suggested. Granted, the Rêve is more 
speculative than the Éléments, but even in the latter, he asks, ‘Why not consider 
sensibility, life and motion as so many properties of matter, since these qualities 
are to be found in every portion, every particle of flesh?’83 Yet, second, it is clear 
that different viewpoints are adopted, not some kind of perpetual polyphony. Thus 
in the Réfutation d’Helvétius, four years after the Rêve, Diderot calls the general 
sensibility of matter a mere ‘supposition’, which is not sufficient for ‘good philos
ophy’, and admits that ‘the necessary connexion in this shift, escapes me’.84 That 
is, how can inert matter become active matter? This is why epigenetic processes 
such as embryo growth in the egg are so metaphysically ‘pregnant’, so to speak, 
                                                          
79 Diderot, Observations sur Hemsterhuis, in Diderot 1975–, Vol. 24, 304. 
80 See the brief but useful discussion in Duflo 2006, 347–352. 
81 Wolfe 2010, 57, 65. 
82 Diderot 1769/1975–, 105. 
83 Diderot 1778/1975–, 333. 
84 Diderot 1875/1994, 297–298. 
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for Diderot: because they provide evidence that out of exclusively material layers 
something like life (a.k.a. sensibility) emerges. Hence sciences such as the nascent 
biology of the eighteenth century but also chemistry and medicine are of great im
portance, if not in filling out the blanks in this ‘passage’ so that all necessary caus
al links are made explicit, at least in articulating it as a material process. 
If Diderot’s 1759 and 1765 letters treat us to some real phantasmagorias, with 
the idea of matter possessing sensation for all eternity85 so that the molecules of 
lovers buried side by side will join together after the deaths of their individual or
ganisms, and less romantically, the description of the animal as a ‘laboratory’ in 
which sensibility shifts from inert to active,86 in the last texts, including the 
Eléments, the problem of whether sensibility is a universal property of matter in
deed becomes strictly experimental, with considerations of flayed vipers, the 
trunks of eels, and sectioned grass snakes: 
I am inclined to believe that sensibility is nothing other than the motion of animal 
substance, its corollary; for if I introduce torpor, i.e., the end of movement at a given 
point, sensibility also ceases. […] 
The sensibility of matter is the specific life of the organs. The proof of this is obvious in 
the viper that has been skinned and beheaded; in the section of the eel and other fish, in 
the grass snake divided into parts, in the various separate, palpitating parts of the body, in 
the contraction of the heart when it is pricked.87 
And he explicitly uses the language of ‘demonstration’: ‘Someday it will be 
demonstrated that sensibility or touch is a sense common to all beings. Some phe
nomena already indicate this’.88 Sensibility as the life ‘proper to organs’, as a 
sense which is ‘common to all beings’: we are back at a vitalist vision of sensibil
ity as the life of a system of organs. 
                                                          
85 ‘Feeling and life are eternal. What lives has always lived and always will. The only difference 
I know between death and life is that at present, you live as one mass, and that once dissolved, 
scattered into molecules, twenty years from now you will live in detail.’ (Diderot, letter to So
phie Volland, 17 October 1759, in Diderot 1955–1961, Vol. 2, 283–284.) 
86 Diderot, letter to Duclos, 10 October 1765, in Diderot 1955–1961, Vol. 5, 141. 
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between inertia and motion (Chouillet 1984, 54). 
88 Diderot 1778/1975–, 308. 
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4 Conclusion 
Diderot adopts a vitalist solution to the series of metaphysical aporias concerning 
sensibility and matter. He did not opt for the straightforward solution that sensibil
ity results from organisation, instead stating, even when discussing particulars 
such as grass snakes (much as La Mettrie had combined the metaphysics of irrita
bility with the case of lizards in one passage), that sensibility is a property of mat
ter. As Timo Kaitaro has put it, if sensibility results from organisation, one then 
has the problem of explaining this organisation, whereas if matter possesses some 
vital properties, an elementary form of sensibility, this could be used in explaining 
its tendency to form organised wholes.89 And, as we saw with respect to Fouquet, 
Bordeu, and La Mettrie’s versions of the organism as composed of little lives, 
there are also different degrees in their articulations of organisational ‘wholeness’. 
The aporias of living and dead matter, inert and active sensibility, and generally, 
sensibility as ontologically irreducible or as a result of certain types of organisa
tion, may or may not be fully resolved, even if it is hopefully clear that the subtle 
vitalist reflections did not just arrive at Diderot’s ‘sciencefiction’ or phantasma
gorias as a terminus. But we have seen that the property of sensibility acts as a 
conceptual booster—the materialist’s privileged route of access to ‘what lies high
er’, as seen with the dialogue between Diderot and d’Alembert—and one which is 
of specifically medical origin. 
In the end, for Diderot, rocks do not sense except in the rather ‘God’seye’, 
Spinozist sense that in the long run, they too will be ‘animalised’. Organisms 
sense; sensibility is the definitory property of organic matter. Thought cannot re
sult from the mere spatial proximity of molecules, the contiguity of matter; it ‘re
sults from sensibility’, which is inert in corps bruts like rocks, and active in living 
bodies, by being assimilated with ‘living animal substance’.90 In addition to the ra
ther technical considerations we have encountered concerning how organisms 
hang together, it is important to remember that if d’Alembert grants Diderot’s 
claim that matter can sense—that sensibility is a universal or general property of 
matter—he will have granted everything, for Diderot, in this extending an empiri
cist insight which nowhere appears as radically as in his version, has collapsed all 
cognitive functions into modes of sensation: ‘The only thing that is innate is the 
faculty of sensing and thinking; all the rest is acquired’, or as d’Holbach has it in 
the Système de la nature (a work on which Diderot was an active collaborator), 
‘What is it to think, enjoy or suffer, if not to sense?’91 
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I have not tried, as is often done, to reconstruct a problem and its solutions, 
such as, ‘how did these thinkers move from a mechanistic model to one recognis
ing the complexity of sensibility as a feature, either of the selfregulation of organ
isms and/or of the nervous system?’ Rather, I have suggested a topography of the 
problem of sensibility as property of matter or as vital force in the mideighteenth 
century, in the tangle of disciplines and discourses devoted to the nature of living, 
biological entities—not an exhaustive cartography of all possible positions or the
ories, but an attempt to understand the ‘triangulation’ of three views: a mechanist, 
or ‘enhanced mechanist’, view in which one can work upwards, step by step from 
the basic property of irritability to the higherlevel property of sensibility (Haller); 
a vitalist view, in which sensibility is fundamental, matching up with a conception 
of the organism as the sum of parts conceived as little lives (Bordeu et al.); and, 
more eclectic, a materialist view which seeks to combine the mechanistic, compo
nential rigour and explanatory power of the Hallerian approach, with the monistic 
and metaphysically explosive potential of the vitalist approach (Diderot). As we 
have seen, the relation between the medicalvitalist approach to sensibility and 
Diderot’s appropriation and transformation of that approach, is not one that lets it
self be labelled easily, although his conceptual innovation in developing what 
Anne Vila calls the ‘superproperty’ of irritability and sensibility taken as a 
whole,92 is undeniable. In the ‘laboratory’ of the animal which forms the meta
physical horizon of the embodied materialist, ‘to sense is to live’.93 
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